A market maker is a firm that continuously offers to buy and sell the same instrument, at slightly different prices, so that anyone who wants to trade can do so without waiting for a counterparty to show up.

The shortest useful definition: a market maker is the person on the other side of your trade when no one else wants to be. The price you pay or receive includes a small premium called the spread, which compensates the maker for the risk and cost of being available. In return, the market keeps working when it would otherwise stop.
A market maker stands ready to buy at one price (the bid) and sell at a slightly higher price (the ask). The two prices are visible to anyone, refreshed continuously, in size large enough to be useful.
When someone arrives wanting to trade right now, the market maker is the counterparty. The other side does not need to wait for a matching natural buyer or seller to show up. That is what continuous liquidity means.
Every fill leaves the market maker holding a position. The job behind the visible quotes is risk management: hedging the inventory, replenishing it, and not running over the limits that keep the operation solvent.

Imagine you want to sell 10,000 shares of a listed company at 11:43 on a Tuesday. Without a market maker, the order sits in the book and waits for a natural buyer who happens to want exactly that quantity at a price close to yours. They might arrive in minutes. They might arrive next week. They might never arrive at the price you wanted.
With a market maker, the order fills immediately. You receive slightly less than the mid-price, because the maker has to charge the spread to compensate for the risk of holding the position until they can offload it. But the trade happens. The friction between deciding to trade and actually trading collapses from days to seconds.
Multiply this across a whole market. Every investor who can trade quickly becomes a more confident participant. Confident participants generate more volume. More volume narrows spreads further. The presence of disciplined market making is the difference between a market that institutions are willing to allocate capital to and a market they avoid entirely.
The headline answer is: the spread. The fuller answer is that the spread compensates for three real costs, and a market maker that does not understand all three goes out of business inside a year.
Between buying and selling, the position is exposed to price movement. The wider the price could move, the wider the spread needed to cover the risk in expectation.
Some of the people trading against your quotes know something you do not. They will systematically hit stale quotes for profit. The spread has to cover that statistical drag.
Hedging, clearing, technology, compliance, capital. The spread covers the full cost of being available, not just the fill itself.
A discretionary market maker is a human trader (or a small desk) who manually quotes prices, manages inventory, and decides when to widen or tighten. This is how market making was done for most of its history. It still works for low-volume or relationship-driven markets.
An algorithmic market maker uses software to do the same work continuously and consistently. The advantages are speed (sub-millisecond quote updates), coverage (hundreds of instruments at once), and discipline (the system does not get tired, emotional, or distracted). The disadvantages are upfront cost and the requirement for serious technology and quantitative work behind the scenes.
For most modern listed venues, algorithmic is the default. The systems quote tighter, fill more reliably, and compress overall transaction costs in ways a human desk physically cannot match. The trade-off is that the operation has to be built, regulated, and monitored at a level a discretionary desk does not require.
The intuition many people have is that thin markets, with low volume, do not really need a market maker. There is not much trading to facilitate. The actual situation is closer to the opposite. Thin markets need market makers in order to stop being thin.
Without continuous quoting, a thin market becomes self-reinforcing. Wide spreads discourage participation. Discouraged participation reduces volume. Reduced volume makes the spread wider still. The book empties. Institutional allocators write the venue off entirely. The market settles into a low-equilibrium state that can last for decades.
A disciplined market maker, even one operating in a single instrument at modest size, breaks that feedback loop. The continuous bid and ask define the spread rather than letting it drift. Counterparties who would otherwise have walked away now have a price they can transact against. Volume builds. The maker gets to tighten quotes as the inventory turnover proves stable. Over months and years, the market deepens.
This is the underlying logic of every emerging-market liquidity initiative. The market maker is not extracting value from a vibrant ecosystem. The market maker is the bootstrap that makes the ecosystem possible. On the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange and on NSE NEXT in Kenya, this is the work in front of Shabba: not to skim a margin from an existing market, but to be the operational standard that lets the market become a real market.
No. The strategy is the opposite. A market maker that consistently trades against customer information disappears, because informed flow is exactly what bankrupts a market maker who cannot price it. Modern algorithmic providers go to significant lengths to detect informed flow and widen quotes to compensate, not pick it off.
The spread is compensation for risk and cost. Risk because every position holds market exposure between fills. Cost because hedging and inventory carry are real expenses. After both, the net margin on a single fill is small. Competitive markets compress spreads to where the maker covers costs and earns a return on capital, not where they extract maximum rent.
In ordinary conditions the opposite is true: continuous quoting absorbs short-term order imbalance and damps price swings that would otherwise compound. In genuine stress events, market makers can widen quotes or step back to manage risk, which looks like an increase in volatility. The underlying cause is the shock, not the maker.